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A NEW THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Charles R. Tittle*
NORMS, DEVIANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CONCEPTUAL MATTERS. By Jack P. Gibbs. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1981.
Pp. 190. $25.
A perennial problem for social scientists is that almost everything
they study is ill-defined. Everyone knows, for instance, that some
individuals have more power than others, that people differ in honesty, and that people reflect various degrees of "tightness" in their
associations with each other. Yet, "power," "honesty," "group cohesion," and even "group" defy conceptualizations that simultaneously
reflect the essence of social reality, are empirically applicable in research, and can be agreed upon by most practicing social scientists.
Indeed, almost every social science concept has been defined in numerous and diverse ways. Moreover, the definitions not only diverge
but often tum out to be so vague that they cannot be used in cumulative research or theory building.
Little wonder, then, that so much of the social science literature is
devoted to problems of communication: Untold pages of print are
wasted arguing about what was said, what was meant by what was
said, and what the evidence implies for various vaguely conceived
theories. In short, most of the time social scientists do not know
what they are talking about because they do not bother to make
their conceptualizations clear or to consider all the ramifications of
the concepts that they explicitly or implicitly embrace. What is even
more distressing is that most social scientists rarely worry about this
situation. Probably the only time they truly agonize over the inadequacy of definitions is when someone so convincingly exposes a conceptual muddle that it can simply no longer be ignored.
This is exactly what Professor Jack Gibbs has done in his latest
book, Norms, Deviance, and Social Control. He shows us by logic
and example that all of the currently popular definitions or conceptualizations of social control are either impossibly broad or absurdly
narrow, always vague, and usually empirically inapplicable. It is a
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compelling object lesson to see a list of twelve to fifteen definitions of
some concept lined up next to each other. In the case of social control, we find definitions ranging from that of E.A. Ross, who thought
of social control as practically anything that influences human behavior, all the way to the contemporary conventional conception
that identifies social control as "actions that counteract deviance."
The conventional conceptualization - which Gibbs calls the prophylactic approach - is imprecise because it does not specify which
social actions fall under the rubric of "social control." Nor does it
spell out who must initiate such actions. Most scholars simply assume that punishing actions imposed by recognized governmental
authorities qualify; however, both "punishing" and "recognized governmental authorities" are subject to varying interpretations. In addition, this conceptualization ignores the question of intent and
implies that only successful counteraction of deviance qualifies as
social control. But the main problem with the popular prophylactic
definition is that it assumes an adequate preexisting conceptualization of "deviance." If social control is supposed to counteract deviance, scholars must be able to identify what is deviant behavior
before they can speak of controlling it.
Yet, deviance is itself one of those concepts that has no agreedupon definition, with conceptualizations ranging from those set forth
by proponents of the labeling perspective to those that might be
termed "moralistic." If one takes the approach of the labelists, deviance is indicated in particular instances by official negative reaction
to some behavior. But applying this definition requires answers to
questions about who must react, in what way, and with what results.
Social control then becomes little more than a tautology. A more
popular way of conceptualizing deviance is by reference to "norms,"
but this in tum requires an adequate definition of norms. Gibbs
demonstrates that typical normative concepts, although less divergent than concepts of deviance or social control, nevertheless require
specifications about who must "share evaluations of conduct," and
how many group members must agree in order to qualify something
as a norm. There are also problems concerning variables (such as
age, sex, or circumstances) that influence whether something is acceptable or not, with the result that one has to wonder if there is a
general norm about any behavior. Moreover, those who set forth
definitions of norms in terms of evaluations of conduct fail to indicate how one is to take into account differences in the power of various "evaluators."
From almost any perspective, social control is a vague idea; it is
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vaguer still because the component concepts with which it is conventionally defined are themselves vague and imprecise, two steps removed. Clearly, then, social control cries out for reconceptualization.
Having laid this groundwork, Gibbs then goes on to propose a
new conceptualization of social control. He believes that it overcomes the definitional problems of other approaches, provides an interesting and largely unexplored subject matter, and has great
theoretical potential. Succinctly, the new conceptualization states
that social control is any attempt by one party to manipulate the
behavior of a second party through a third party by any means other
than a normal chain of command. Within this general definition,
but without pretense of being exhaustive, he distinguishes five major
types of social control, each with numerous subtypes. The five major
types are referential, vicarious, allegative, modulative, and preclusive social control. In assessing Gibbs's conceptualization, some detail here becomes unavoidable.
Referential social control is said to involve attempts by one party
to manipulate a second party's behavior by referring to a third party.
Gibbs identifies eight subtypes of referential social control, and illustrates each with concrete examples. For instance, commensalistic social control occurs when a child attempts to retrieve his candy from a
sibling by threatening to tell their mother. The reference to a third
party here assumes common respect for, or fear of, the third party.
In the case of juridical social control, someone (such as an attorney)
tries to manipulate the behavior of a judge by referring to the behavior of other judges in previous cases. Similarly, a politician may
practice associational social control to gamer votes by implying that
he agrees with a popular president. And even whole groups of people may qualify as practitioners (first party participants) or recipients
(second party participants) of social control, as in the example of
authoritative social control where the officials of a government
agency try to influence the population of smokers or potential smokers by referring to the surgeon general's report on the hazards of
cigarette smoking.
Vicarious social control occurs when a first party tries to influence the behavior of a second party by punishing, rewarding, or rectifying a third party's behavior. Gibbs mentions four subtypes:
deterrent, hypocritical, advancive, and placative social control. For
instance, a judge (first party) practices deterrent social control when
he sentences somebody (third party) to prison in the belief that this
will generally deter the population of potential offenders (second
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party). The same judge may exhibit hypocritical social control by
sentencing an unpopular defendant to a long prison term in order to
win public support for an election campaign. Or he might engage in
placative social control by sentencing a person to be hanged to satisfy the demands of a mob. In all such instances of vicarious social
control, action is taken against one party for the purpose of influencing somebody not directly involved in the actio.n.
The third subtype, called allegative social control, occurs when a
first party alleges something to a third party about a second party in
the expectation that the third party will influence the second party's
behavior. Gibbs illustrates seven subtypes of allegative social control. Examples include: (1) appellative social control, when a child
tattles to his mother that his brother has taken some candy in the
hope that she will punish the brother or at least get the candy back;
(2) adversarial social control, when a plaintiff testifies that a defendant has been negligent, expecting the court to order payment of damages; and (3) ameliorative social control, when a father tells a
psychiatrist that his daughter attempted suicide in order to get the
psychiatrist to employ therapy.
Modulative social control is a subtype that involves attempts by a
first party to influence a second party by using the presumed influence of a third party on the second but without exclusive reliance on
allegations about the second party or references to the third in communications with the second. Five subtypes are identified, but they
are somewhat more difficult to understand than the previous examples. Identificational social control occurs when a youth director arranges a visit by a popular athlete on the assumption that, as a result,
young people in that area will participate more fully in the program.
In this instance, the youth director is trying to manipulate the youths
through the popular athlete, but he neither makes allegations about
the youths to the athlete nor exhorts the youths by directly referring
to the athlete. A second example is isolative social control, where a
judge incarcerates a youth to neutralize his bad influence on other
youths in the area. Here the judge (first party) tries to influence the
behavior of the area youths (second party) through a third party (incarcerated youth) without directly referring to the incarcerated youth
in communications with the other youths and without making allegations to the incarcerated youth about the area youths.
The final type of social control that Gibbs identifies is preclusive
social control, a type that is even more complex than modulative
social control, particularly since it functions much as a residual category. Preclusive social control is said to involve using a third party
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to gather information about a second party, directing a third party to
use coercion to limit the behavior of the second party to certain contexts, or taking any action that can facilitate manipulation of the second party through the third. One subtype, informative social
control, occurs when a police official encourages an informant to
provide information about subversive activity that can later be used
for manipulating the behavior of the subversives. Preemptive social
control occurs when a company owner inquires into the background
of an applicant for employment so that employment can be refused
if the applicant is found dishonest or unreliable. Exclusionary social
control is practiced by legislators when they enact laws excluding
communists from the country. In all of these examples, the first
party may be planning to exercise social control but is not actually
doing so since there is no immediate intent to manipulate the behavior of the second party through the use of the third. Yet, Gibbs classifi.es such actions as fitting his definition of social control because
they are taken with an eye to eventually altering behavior.
The new conceptualization identifies human conduct that is
clearly social because it always involves at least three social entities.
It qualifies as a form of control because it involves attempts to impose the will of one social entity upon another. Furthermore, social
control is set in a general classification of control that allows it to be
distinguished from material control as well as from other forms of
biological control. Indeed, social control here comes to be a subtype
of extemalistic, human, animate control to be definitely separated
from intemalistic or directorial control. Thus, Gibbs hopes to avoid
many problems of other conceptualizations, which ignore the existence of a general scheme of control phenomena. In particular, his
definition bypasses definitional difficulties encountered by others
who have tried to think of social control with reference to norms or
deviance.
The new conceptualization is justified as being freer from definitional ambiguities than previous ones and as identifying a unique
subject matter. Nevertheless, one of its strengths is that many of the
phonemena typically studied by students of "social control" are subsumed within the scheme. For instance, most proponents of the prophylactic approach to social control show particular interest in the
work of agents of the law and in the legal machinery of sanctioning.
Within Gibb's scheme, much of the work of legal agents also qualifies as social control, especially those acts aimed at general deterrence. Curiously, however, this conceptualization does not treat
direct actions by police or judges aimed at specific deterrence as so-
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cial control. When one party uses coercion or imposes a sanction on
another party, it qualifies as proximate, not social, control. Hence,
many criminologists are going to be surprised to learn that all their
work concerning sanctions really has little to do with the new approach to social control. This is unfortunate and a little confusing.
In addition, it points up one of several potential difficulties in applying the definition.
The most important difficulty is that social control networks may
be contained within other social control networks so that activities or
actions may qualify or not qualify as social control, depending upon
where one chooses to make a cutting point. Consider the case of a
judge who sentences a felon on the assumption that the felon will be
deterred from future crime. Presumably this is proximate rather
than social control, but the sentence may be regarded as an instruction to prison officials (or even to the general public), which directs
them to do something to influence the felon. This would qualify it as
modulative social control. On the other hand, action by prison officials designed to manipulate the future behavior of the felon may be
only proximate control, even though it is the continuation of a sequence of social control in which the instructions of a judge are implemented. More confusing still, the judge's sentence may be
excluded as an instance of social control if his action is interpreted as
an instruction to prison officials but is regarded as a simple resort to
a chain of command.
In my mind, there is no reason why all instances of sanctioning
by legal agents could not qualify as a special kind of social control in
the Gibbsian scheme since they always involve at least a general effort by a first party (such as a legislature) to influence conduct of a
population by the use of a third party (police, judges, prison officials). Yet, to broaden the scope of definition, as I have suggested is
possible, opens the door to the very kind of generality that has made
previous definitions of social control imprecise. Still, the new conceptualization, even in its narrowed form, does handle most of what
has popularly become known as social control, even those things that
Gibbs demonstrates are hopelessly mired in definitional imprecision.
All efforts to control deviance may be social control, provided the
first party acts on the assumption that the behavior to be manipulated is deviant. Similarly, behaviors that particular actors try to
manipulate may have a normative quality and the methods used in
manipulation may acquire normative characteristics. Most of the
things sociologists call informal social control- gossip, status denigration, and the like - are also subsumable under Gibb's model.
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But the new approach goes far beyond conventional ideas, particularly by encompassing activities like advertising, propaganda, and
administrative actions.
In the end, of course, definitions are arbitrary and essentially useless unless they point the way to an understanding of some interesting realm of human behavior. The crucial vehicle for that
understanding is theory. A definition only identifies a subject matter; it does not explain it. Because Gibbs is fully aware of this, he
attempts to spell out some theoretical postulates and to set his approach within the theoretical parameters that have most often characterized the field of "social control." In particular, he formulates
hypotheses about the sociocultural conditions under which one type
of social control will prevail over other types, and attempts to justify
them theoretically. Unfortunately, this is the weakest part of the
book. Several of the arguments simply do not ring true (Is it really
the case, for example, that in situations of high normative consensus
all requests by one member to another will be honored?).
In my opinion, Gibbs has sold his own product short. Although
his suggested theoretical guideposts are unexciting1 the scheme he
has formulated is a veritable gold mine of provocative questions. I,
for one, can hardly think about the examples he discusses without
finding hypotheses and rudimentary explanations running through
my head. For instance, the question of when social control will be
more effective than proximate control jumps right out, suggesting the
hypothesis that social control will always be more effective because it
minimizes the necessity for social and psychological face-saving defense mechanisms. From this beginning one could begin to formulate a theory of social influence. Moreover, the invitation to discover
and explain the conditions under which one form of social control
dominates another is powerful.
In short, although the scheme may not live up to the author's
description of it as "the final definition of social control," it does
have much potential. In fact, I suspect that of all the intellectual
contributions Gibbs has made (and there have been many), this one
will be the most significant. This is not to say that there are no
problems with the conceptualization. The confusion and definitional
ambiguity surrounding the so-called preclusive types of social control, the difficulty in measuring or inferring intent, the exclusion of
chains of command, the inability easily to incorporate direct acts of
sanctioning, the failure to deal with situations where control is effected through third parties but not intended, the neglect of distinctions between institutionalized and spontaneous social control, and
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the thinness of the suggested theoretical arguments all suggest that
work remains to be done. Nevertheless, Gibbs is certainly on target
in exposing definitional problems and he has identified a domain of
study sorely in need of attention. The next step is for other scholars
to undertake the theoretical and empirical work necessary to make
social control a rich specialty.

